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Michael P. Zirinsky 
IMPERIAL POWER AND DICTATORSHIP: 
BRITAIN AND THE RISE OF 
REZA SHAH, 1921-1926 
[Reza Khan] seemed to me a strong and fearless man who had his country's good at 
heart. 
-Sir Edmund Ironside, recalling late 1920 
Reza ... has never spoken for himself, nor ... [his] Government ... but only on 
behalf of his country .... 
-Sir Percy Loraine, January 1922 
He is secretive, suspicious and ignorant; he appears wholly unable to grasp the 
realities of the situation or to realise the force of the hostility he has aroused. 
-Harold Nicolson, September 1926 
I fear we can do nothing to humanise this bloodthirsty lunatic. 
-Sir Robert Vansittart, December 1933 
Born in obscurity about 1878 and soon orphaned, Reza Pahlavi enlisted at fifteen 
in a Russian-officered Cossack brigade. Rising through the ranks, he provided 
force for a February 1921 coup d'etat, seizing power for journalist Sayyid Zia al-
Din Tabatabai. Reza Khan provided strength in the new government and rose from 
army commander to minister of war (April 1921) to prime minister (1923) and, 
after failing to make a republic in 1924, to the throne in 1925. As shah he ruled 
with increasingly arbitrary power until Britain and Russia deposed him in 1941. 
He died in exile in 1944.1 
This paper examines British activity in Iran during Reza's rise to the throne and 
analyzes the longstanding belief that Britain made Reza shah of Iran. Within the 
context of Iranian and British history it tracks British involvement in the coup that 
first brought Reza to power and explores the policy of Sir Percy Loraine, British 
minister in Tehran, 1921-26. It shows that Britain did less than is believed by 
those who accept the myth, but more than London thought at the time: British aid 
to the coup was a key to its success, and aid to Reza helped him survive; Loraine's 
policy of good relations and nonintervention was part of the process by which 
Reza came to dominate Iran. 
Michael P. Zirinsky teaches history at Boise State University, 1910 University Drive, Boise, Idaho 
83725, U.S.A. 
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THE IRANIAN CONTEXT FOR REZA'S RISE 
Events during the years of Reza's rise, 1921-26, were crucial to Iran's survival as 
an independent state. Before the 1921 coup, the situation in Iran was chaotic. Cen-
tral government authority had been weak throughout the Qajar period (1796-
1925). After the 1896 assassination of Nasir aI-Din Shah, Tehran seemedincapa-
bIe of defending Iran against Russia and Britain or even of maintaining order. Its 
only modern forces were a Russian-officered Cossack brigade, established in 
1879, and a Swedish-officered gendarmerie, established in 1911. 
A long-standing civil-clerical rivalry added to the chaos. From the time the 
Safavids established Twelver Shicism as Iran's state religion in the 16th century, 
the public tended to identify Iran with ShiCite Islam. Some ulema saw secular 
power as usurpation of the Hidden Imam's authority. During Qajar times the 
ulema put themselves forward as protectors against secular tyranny. During the 
Iranian revolutionary movement (the Tobacco Protest [1891-92] and the constitu-
tional period [1905"":11]), clergy also expressed hostility toward foreign influence, 
which seemed to be destroying Iran's independence and destabilizing the country, 
and mobilized mass support for national ideas. Nasir aI-Din Shah withdrew the 
British tobacco monopoly and Muzaffar aI-Din Shah accepted a constitution 
largely because the government could not resist clerically supported urban demon-
strations.2 
The presence of strong foreign powers contributed to instability. During the 
Constitutional Revolution, Iranian efforts to break Anglo-Russian control by es-
tablishing parliamentary government and pursuing a "third-power" policy failed, 
in part because proconstitutional forces in the new Majlis split between liberal, 
democrats and more traditional moderates. Furthermore, central authority declined 
after democratic and tribal forces deposed Muhammad Ali Shah in 1909. Britain 
and Russia crushed Iran by the end of 1911 when they forced Morgan Shuster, an 
American hired by the Majlis as treasurer general, out of office and suppressed the 
assembly. 
Attempts to oppose Anglo-Russian domination by tilting toward Germany and 
Turkey during World War I transformed Iran into a battlefield. Overrun during 
and immediately after the war by Russian, Ottoman, German, and British forces, 
about a quarter of the Iranian popUlation died. After the collapse of Russia, Tur-
key, and Germany, British forces occupied much of Iran. England dominated 
Tehran's governments, subsidizing the shah, the cabinet, and the military. Conse-
quently, Tabriz, Rasht, and Mashhad resisted Tehran's orders, and the tribes 
(about one-quarter of the population) ignored central authority.3 
Iranian leaders responded to their country's situation in four ways, with a pro-
British policy, a pro-Russian policy, a third-power policy, and with isolation. 
Pro-British Policy 
Some Iranians seemed to collaborate with British efforts to make Iran a protector-
ate, with mixed success. In 1919, at Lord Curzon's direction, British minister in 
Tehran Sir Percy Z. Cox negotiated a treaty with the government of Mirza Hassan 
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Vosuq al-Dauleh that proposed to give Britain control of Iran's finances and armed
forces." As soon as Vosuq, Foreign Minister Firuz Mirza, and Finance Minister
Akbar Mirza Sarem al-Dauleh signed the Anglo-Persian Agreement on 9 August
1919, they put into force some of its most important provisions without waiting
for Majlis ratification.
In October, London designated Sidney Armitage-Smith as financial 'adviser to
take charge of the Ministry of Finance. Part of his task was to. induce Iran to repay
millions of pounds Britain claimed Iran owed. Most of the money in question had
been advanced to pro-British governments as subsidies or paid to maintain the
British forces in the oil fields. Iran denied it owed the money, which it alleged
Britain had spent on its own behalf. By the time Armitage-Smith arrived in Tehran
in May 1920, Iranian opinion had so turned against the agreement that he received
no cooperation.'
British officers were put in charge of Iranian armed forces. Major-General Wil-
liam E. R. Dickson, formerly inspector general of the East Persia Cordon, headed
an Anglo-Iranian military commission charged with organizing a uniform army.
Iranian opposition was deep; British-educated commission secretary, gendarmerie
Colonel Fazlullah Khan, killed himself on 21,March 1920, rather than sign a re-
port authorizing British command over the army. Many other Iranian officers, in-
cluding Reza Khan, also felt strongly that they did not want to exchange Russian
or Swedish masters for Britons. They wanted independence.?
The most effective opposition was passive. When Vosuq's decision not to con-
vene a pliant Majlis became unacceptable to England, British minister Herman
Norman (Cox's successor) had Ahmad Shah name Moshir al-Dauleh (HassanPir-
nia) prime minister in June 1920. When Moshir did not convene a Majlis, Norman
had Muhammad Vali Khan (Sepahdar) put in charge in November."
These politicians had mixed motives for working with Britain. To some extent
they must have believed that survival dictated bending before overwhelming
power. They may also have accepted Curzon's claim that the treaty guaranteed
Iran's independence and territorial integrity. Certainly financial inducements
played a role; Britain promised Iran a £2 million loan and paid the Iranian signers
of the treaty a £131,000 bribe." These men also were landowners whose properties
were endangered by revolutionary events in Gilan which threatened to spread
throughout Iran.
There were alternatives to collaboration. Other Iranian leaders responded to
Iran's situation by trying to thwart British hegemony.
Pro-Russian Policy
Some Iranians-notably northern merchants whose trade with Russia Britain had
embargoed-sought to restore equilibrium to Iran's policy by restoring good rela-
tions with Russia. The Soviets encouraged Iranian efforts to restore equilibrium by
denouncing both the 1907 and 1915 partitions and also capitulations and conces-
sions. This policy bore fruit in an Irano-Soviet treaty-negotiation for which was
begun by the government of Moshir al-Dowleh-signed by Seyyid Zia's govern-
ment on 26 February 1921.9
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Hope of restoring equilibrium was complicated by the Russian civil war. Under
the command of General H. B. Champain after Dunsterville's retirement, the Brit-
ish North Persia Force (Norperforce) sought to support the Whites in the Cauca-
sus. When Denikin was defeated, Norperforce retired to Enzali, Rasht, and
Qazvin. Baku fell to the Bolsheviks in April 1920, and in early May Champain in-
terned Denikin's Caspian Sea fleet at Enzali. Although the War Office, Treasury,
and India Office had by this time concluded it was no longer feasible for the army
to remain in such an exposed position, Foreign Secretary Curzon-still hoping for
ratification of the 1919 agreement and fearing British withdrawal would doom
it-blocked Champain's retreat. Alarmed by the threat of a continued White pres-
ence on the Caspian, the Bolsheviks attacked, overwhelming British forces at En-
zali on 18 May 1920. Norperforce evacuated Rasht on 2 June, falling back to
Qazvin. This British humiliation doomed Curzon's hopes; 10 Soviet forces occupied
Gilan, and Iran once again seemed partitioned between Russia and Britain.
Many Iranians therefore sought to act locally against what they saw as a puppet
government in Tehran. Because they regarded restoration of equilibrium as a rea-
sonable means of restoring independence, they opened themselves up to charges
that they favored the Bolsheviks. Muslim nationalist Mirza Kuchik Khan led one
such revolt from Gilan. In 1915, he launched the Jangali movement (popularly
named after the jangal, the Caspian coast's thick forest) in favor of Iranian inde-
pendence and in opposition to corruption. He accepted support from Ottoman pan-
Islamic activists, who provided weapons used against Russia and Britain, as well
as from Iranian democrats and socialists like Ehsanollah Khan. With the support
of peasants and landlords he established an Islamic government calling for demo-
cratic, social, and national reforms. II .
Entering Gilan in 1918 en route to Baku, Dunsterville forced his way through
the Manjil pass against Jangali resistance. On 20 July the Jangalis burned the Brit-
ish consulate at Rasht, taking prisoners later exchanged for Democrat Suleiman
Mirza Iskandari (jailed by Britain in 1916). To avoid becoming tied down, the
British then worked out a modus vivendi with the Jangalis, which Champain broke
in March 1919 at Vosuq's urging. When the 1919 agreement was announced the
Jangalis gained wide. support. After the Soviets forced the British from Gilan, the
Jangalis proclaimed a Soviet Socialist Republic at Rasht on 4 June 1920.12
This episode has been described as "the first Soviet experiment in Iran.?" an
effort to separate Gilan from Iran, perhaps even to annex it to the Soviet Union.
While this may have been an object of some of Kuchik's more radical allies-such
as Avetis Sultanzadeh" and Seyyed Jafar Javad Zadeh Pishevari-Kuchik Khan
himself and most of his supporters were motivated by Iranian patriotism and
ShiCite Islamic values. This interpretation is supported by the Jangali exchange of
British prisoners for Suleiman Iskandari as well as by Kuchik Khan's support from
Democrats, ulema, and Ahmad Shah, who hoped Jangali success would reduce
British influence.
Another revolt at this time was led by Sheikh Muhammad Khiabani, a clerical
leader of the democratic movement in Azarbayjan. In the 1911 Majlis, he de-
fended Morgan Shuster as a symbol of Iranian independence. During World War I
he came into conflict with Ottoman officials in Azarbayjan; as a Shi'iite leader and
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patriot he opposed both Sunni domination of Azarbayjan and pan-Turanism. Dur-
ing the post-World War I struggle for Iranian independence, Khiabani was the 
leading democrat in Tabriz. Opposing the Vosuq government's acceptance of the 
Anglo-Persian agreement, in April 1920 he cut ties with Tehran and proclaimed 
Azarbayjan an autonomous azadistan (land of freedom). Tehran plotted against 
the democratic regime, inducing the Shahsavan tribe and the Shikkak Kurds under 
Ismail Agha Simko to harry Tabriz. On 13 September Cossacks seized Tabriz, 
shooting Khiabani two days later. 15 
Ultimately the Gilan Republic also failed. Extreme secular elements seized con-
trol of the government at the end of July 1920 and adopted policies to expropriate 
land and requisition food, transportation, and labor. These radical actions divided 
the supporters of the republic, mobilizing landlords, bazaaris, clerics, and peasants 
against it. Kuchik Khan opposed most radical policies as anti-Islamic, but he could 
neither prevent them nor deter sharp infighting among the radicals themselves. 16 
The Red Army's limited presence in Gilan acted as a shield for the Jangalis, in-
hibiting British and Iranian attacks. As a result of negotiations among the British, 
Soviet, and Tehran governments, however, the Soviets and British agreed to evac-
uate Iran. Norperforce withdrew in April 1921, as soon as the snows had melted 
sufficiently to permit withdrawal into Iraq, leaving its small arms, artillery, ammu-
nition, and draft animals to the Iranian Cossacks. Soviet troops agreed to leave 
shortly thereafter. 17 Internal dissension having weakened the Jangalis, Reza 
Khan's Cossacks defeated them in October; Kuchik Khan fled into the mountains 
and froze to death. An alternative to Reza's domination of Iran thus disappeared. 
Third-Power Policy 
Still other Iranians tried to rekindle a third-power policy by involving the United 
States in Iran as a counterweight to Britain, encouraged by American hostility to 
the exclusion of Iran from the Paris Peace Conference and to the Anglo-Persian 
agreement. Among the most prominent Iranians associated with this policy were 
British-educated Hosain Ala, a member of Iran's abortive peace-conference dele-
gation and subsequently Iranian minister to the United States, and Ahmad Qavam 
al-Sultaneh, Vosuq's brother, who was governor of Khorasan in 1919-21 and twice 
prime minister between 1921 and 1923. Qavam sent Ala to Washington in 1921 to 
seek a loan, an oil concession for northern Iran, and technical assistance. Ala hired 
Morgan Shuster to act as an intermediary with New York banking and oil firms.ls 
From this initiative came the 1922-27 Millspaugh mission. With American 
government cooperation, Iran privately hired State Department petroleum adviser 
Arthur C. Millspaugh to be administrator general of Iranian finances, and charged 
him to streamline the collection and distribution of Iranian government revenue. 
Millspaugh's administration established new taxes, including excise taxes on tea 
and sugar and an income tax. Old taxes were rigorously raised, and unpaid taxes 
were collected. Budgets were made and balanced. Millspaugh's success in creating 
regular sources of revenue for the Iranian government, without resorting to tax-
farming or foreign borrowing, essentially made Iran independent of foreign finan-
cial manipulation. 19 
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Isolation 
Another response to the postwar crisis, popularized many years later by Dr. Mos-
sadegh as "negative equilibrium," was expressed at this time by Seyyid Hassan 
Modarres of Isfahan, the most important Islamic leader in the Majlis. During the 
Constitutional Revolution, Modarres helped to organize the moderates. During 
World War I, he was a member of the anti-British, anti-Russian Committee of 
National Defense. Later he supported the Jangali movement, hoping it would 
strengthen Iran against foreigners. As radicals came to dominate Gilan, Modarres 
feared Soviet penetration and control. He opposed the 1921 Irano-Soviet treaty as 
too favorable to Russia (especially its provision for Soviet invasion if Iran became 
a base for a hostile power). He opposed balancing British influence by making 
concessions to Russia, however. Like many patriotic Iranians afterwards, he 
sought to minimize both British and Russian involvement in Iran.20 
These responses to the post-World War I crisis-pursuing balance in relations 
with great powers, seeking powerful friends, and opposing "foreign entangle-
ments"-are enduring themes in Iran's search for a strong, national policy. They 
affected Reza's rise. 
BRITISH IMPERIAL CONTEXT 
Before turning to British involvement in the 1921 coup, a few words are necessary 
about Iran's place in British policy. Whitehall viewed Iran primarily as a buffer 
against Russian expansion toward India; after the discovery of oil, this too was 
important. For much of the 19th century Britain tried to maintain Iranian territo-. 
rial integrity, but German emergence as a naval power caused Britain to seek a 
Russian alliance after 1905.21 
The resulting change in British policy toward Iran was not immediately clear. 
At the start of the Constitutional Revolution Britain encouraged constitutionalists, 
allowing them to protest inside the legation compound during the summer of 
1906.22 In 1907, however, Britain and Russia divided Iran into spheres of influ-
ence; Tehran ostensibly lay in a neutral zone, but in effect they treated all Iran as 
their condominium. When World War I began, Iran became a theater of war on the 
eastern flank of the Ottoman Empire. 
Anglo-Russian cooperation ended with the Bolshevik Revolution. After Soviet 
withdrawal from World War I, Britain continued alone to protect operations in 
Iraq, prevent the Central Powers from taking the Caucasus, stiffen resistance to 
the Bolsheviks, ease partition of Turkey, and safeguard interests in Iran. Curzon 
especially feared that Bolshevism might gain in India and consequently pushed for 
the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement. 
Despite Curzon's concern, Iran was relatively unimportant to Britain. London's 
financial position was weak; Whitehall did not have enough money to defeat the 
Soviets, suppress unrest in Iraq, occupy Iran, and subsidize the Tehran govern-
ment. The Treasury, War Office, India Office, and Colonial Office therefore urged 
withdrawal. To Foreign Office chagrin, politicians and the public seemed not to 
care about preserving Britain's position in Iran; they were more concerned with 
matters nearer home-including relations with France, Germany, and Ireland, and 
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labor unrest in Britain. Over Curzon's objections, the cabinet decided to withdraw 
Norperforce in early spring 1921. The Foreign Office feared chaos would ensue, 
but a coup d'etat during the night of 20-21 February secured Tehran.23 
BRIT AIN AND THE COUP 
Tehran was taken by about 2,500 Cossacks led from Qazvin by Reza Khan who 
thus came to national power. The shah named Sayyid Zia prime minister. Accord-
ing to Donald Wilber, "The British command supplied boots ... cartridges ... 
uniforms, and sixty thousand tomans ... to cover the cost of moving ... soldiers 
from Qazvin to Tehran."24 Tehran rumor declared the coup a British enterprise, 
but Britain denied involvement. 
Whose idea was the coup? Both Reza and Zia later claimed to have been its 
chief architect. At the time, British and American observers saw the coup as 
Zia's.25 Reza's role seemed minor. Norman's first reports indicated that Reza was 
only one of three military leaders,26 that he acted on behalf of Zia, and that he had 
no political ambition. Afterward, Reza claimed to have been in charge all along, 
but this cannot be supported by contemporary evidence. Much later, Norperforce 
commander General Edmund Ironside claimed to have "engineered the coup 
d' etat" on Reza's behalf. While there is no reason to doubt that he recognized Re-
za's ability and encouraged him, his published diary is consistent with an interpre-
tation that Reza was only one of several plotters.27 But of all the conspirators, only 
Reza retained power. 
British involvement with the coup included the following seven points. 
1. Clearing the way. At the advice of Ironside and Norman, Ahmad Shah removed 'the 
Russian Cossack officers in late October 1920. Ironside saw the Russians as militarily 
incompetent, corrupt, and potential Bolsheviks, and he sought to establish the British 
command over Iranian armed forces envisaged by the 1919 agreement. Norman cabled 
London, "ExpUlsion of ... Russian officers and virtual control by British officers of the 
only regular Military Force in Persia would make us practically independent of vagaries 
of Persian internal politics and in absence of external developments ensure gradual 
execution of [the 1919] agreement."28 
2. Military assistance. Britons were assigned to the Cossacks and the gendarmerie to assist 
their training and prepare for a national army. Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Smyth was 
noteworthy as organizer of an abortive Azarbayjan gendarmerie force and as officer 
responsible for training the Cossacks at Qazvin during the winter of 1920-21. Ironside 
himself took an interest in the process and singled out Reza for promotion. The Qazvin 
Cossacks, armed and outfitted from British stores, were paid with British money.29 
3. London proposes a new government. Irked by Sepahdar's weakness toward the Soviets and 
by cabinet pressure to evacuate Iran quickly, on 15 January Curzon told Norman to create 
a strong government, "either for purpose of conducting the affairs of the country from 
Tehran or, should evacuation of the capital become necessary, to provide a rallying point 
at Ispahan."3o While there is no British evidence that the coup resulted from Curzon's 
wish, the matter depends in part on how well subordinates internalized Curzon's desire. 
British officials did aid the coup, independently. 
4. Coordination. Britons acted as intermediaries between Sayyid Zia and the Cossacks. 
Contemporary accounts named legation Oriental Secretary Walter Alexander Smart as 
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"privy to the whole proceeding." In addition to Lieutenant-Colonels Smyth and W. G. 
Grey (who both admitted involvement), legation staffer Victor Mallet and Captain C. J. 
Edmonds also may have been involvedY 
5. Inviting the Cossacks to Tehran. Norman denied prior knowledge of the coup but played 
a major role in introducing Reza's Cossacks into Tehran. He admired Smyth's work with 
the Qazvin Cossacks, which he reported to Curzon on 24 January 1921. Meeting Smyth 
on 8 February, Norman suggested replacing the unruly Tehran Cossacks with a better 
disciplined Qazvin force. He hoped that Tehran Cossack commander Sardar-i-Humayun 
and his subordinate Sardar-i-Makhsus could be removed from office at the same time. 
Norman reported, "Colonel Smyth approved the proposal and expressed the intention of 
sending General Reza Khan, one of his best officers, to Tehran with these reliefs."32 
6. Gaining Iranian compliance. Norman also served as midwife at the birth of Seyyid Zia's 
government. On 20 February 1921, having heard that the Cossacks were nearing Tehran, 
Norman, "sent for General Westdahl, the Swedish chief of police, and impressed on him the 
importance, in case the Cossacks should enter the town, of seeing that his men confined 
themselves to their proper duty of maintaining public order and did not become involved in 
any fighting which might take place." The next day, Reza and Zia having seized Tehran 
"practically without striking a blow," Norman cabled London, "I saw the Shah this morning, 
and advised him to enter into relations with leaders of the movement and acquiesce in their 
demands, which is his only possible course. I was able to reassure him regarding his 
personal safety, and, though frightened, he did not talk of flight.'>33 Ahmad Shah then 
appointed Sayyid Zia prime minister and Reza military commander (sardar sepah). 
7. Legation advocacy for Zia. Norman eagerly ~upported the new regime. Despite Zia's 
immediate revocation of Curzon's agreement, signing a Soviet treaty, and arresting many 
pro-British Iranians, Norman reported that Zia's government, "had been hailed with 
utmost satisfaction by [the] British community here as the most favourable to British 
interests which could possibly have arisen," and he appealed for support. The "general· 
opinion here, which I share, is that Persia now has her last chance, and that if it is lost 
nothing can save the country from Bolshevism." Norman's enthusiasm rings hollow. 
Deeply troubled by rumor that he had planned the COUp,34 he may have been trying to put 
the best face on a situation over which he had little control. 
Whitehall stalled. In reply to Norman's call for support of Zia, Iran desk officer 
George P. Churchill argued, "this would be all very well if there was any element 
of stability in the present regime at Tehran. In view of the uncertainty of the posi-
tion it would ... be wiser to watch events for the present. ... " Curzon wired 
Norman on 28 February that, "Formal denunciation ... is not disguised by state-
ment that no hostility to Great Britain is implied." Two days later Churchill noted, 
"The United States Minister's account of affairs at Tehran is not hopeful. These 
wholesale arrests, which Mr. Norman has not reported; the alleged hostility of the 
populace and the impression that the British are responsible for the coup d'etat, 
lead to the belief that the present regime is not likely to be a success."35 
Sayyid Zia could not retain power. Britain gave him no aid. Norperforce 
quickly withdrew into Iraq, leaving its small arms, artillery, ammunition, and draft 
animals to Reza's Cossacks.36 Zia crudely tried to obtain revenue by arresting 
many of the major landowners, but this weakened his support and provided fertile 
ground for alliances against him. In May, Reza-supported by Ahmad Shah, the 
landowning class, and Soviet minister Theodor Rothstein-forced Zia from office. 
Britain gave Zia refuge in Palestine, and Qavam al-Sultaneh came out of detention 
to become prime ministerY , 
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Despite English help to the plotters, the coup did not aid Britain. London knew 
nothing about it, and Norman had little clue as to what Zia and Reza planned. 
What Britain chiefly got from the coup was the reputation of having been behind 
it, and that idea was proof to nationalists of England's perfidy. The coup chiefly 
benefited Reza Khan, newly placed at the center of the nation. His position subse-
quently strengthened when Norperforce left him its arms. Over the next years he 
used his new prominence to work for policies he favored and to augment his per-
sonal wealth and power. 
A PERIOD OF TRANSITION 
Although it is tempting to conclude that Reza Khan was already a dictator,38 his 
power was actually tenuous. During the next five years, in alliance with key Ira-
nian political forces and with the support of Great Britain, he slowly increased his 
strength until he could crown himself shah. 
During the Fourth Majlis (1921-23), Reza aligned himself with the Reformers' 
party-heirs of the moderates, whose landowner and ulema leaders included Qa-
vam, Prince Firuz, and Modarres. Reza liberated Zia's prisoners, including Qavam 
and Firuz, and openly aligned himself with the ulema. In 1923 he welcomed aya-
tollahs Sheikh Muhammad Husayn al-Nacini and Sayyid Abu aI-Hasan al-Musavi 
al-Isfahani, who had been expelled from Najaf and Karbala by the British. Reza 
also coopted Prince Farmanfarma's nephew Dr. Muhammad Mossadegh and pre-
vailed upon him to serve as finance minister in Qavam's 1921 cabinet and as gov-
ernor of Azarbayjan for Moshir al-Dauleh's government in early 1922.39 
The reformers shared with Reza aims of reducing foreign power and ending 
separatist movements. They supported elimination of foreign officers from the 
Cossacks and gendarmerie. When efforts to bring the gendarmerie under War 
Ministry controlled to revolts in Mashhad (October 1921) by Colonel Taqi Khan 
Pasyan and in Tabriz (January-February 1922) by Major Lahuti Khan, who tried 
to mobilize local democrats against Tehran, the Majlis-including its demo-
crats-supported Reza. Likewise, his army ended Kuchik Khan's Jangali move-
ment in November 1921, terminated the independence of Simko's Shikkak Kurds 
during the summer and fall of 1922, and suppressed the Sanjabi Kurds in 1923.40 
Reza Khan also cooperated with the reformers in support of a third-power pol-
icy. The Millspaugh mission helped to build the army by tapping Iranian wealth, 
and much of Millspaugh's success came at bayonet point. Much more than in Zia's 
time, Reza made good his 20 February 1921 statement to Walter Smart and Lieu-
tenant-Colonels Haig and Huddleston at Mehrabad that "there was plenty of 
money in Persia, and [we] well know where to find it." Under Millspaugh's man-
agement, half of the government revenue was expended on the army.41 
Reza's primary objective was to build the army. As early as May 1921, he indi-
cated a desire for 100,000 men (almost twenty times the existing Cossack force). 
In the waning days of the Fourth Majlis he broke with Modarres over the con-
scription that would be necessary to recruit such a large army.42 
After the Fourth Majlis ended (in October 1923) Reza had the shah name him 
prime minister, at the same time exiling Ahmad to Europe. Next, Reza used the 
army to rig elections for the Fifth Majlis (1924-25) in favor of secular reformers 
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in the Tajadod (revival) and Socialist parties, heirs of the Democrats, who sup-
ported Reza's objective of a modern, centralized Iran. 
Tajadod leaders included Ali Akbar Davar (educated in law at Geneva), Abdul 
Hussein Timourtash (Russian military education; governor of Gilan at the time of the 
suppression of the Jangali movement), Sayyid Muhammad Tadayun, and Muham-
mad Ali Foroughi (Zuka al-Mulk). These secular reformers aimed at -erasing ethnic 
diversities and autonomist movements and, in 1921-26, sought to create a powerful 
central government that would introduce reform from above. Their program for na-
tional strength included the following policies: creating a well-disciplined national 
army and an honest professional bureaucracy, ending capitulations, settling the no-
madic tribes, expanding Western-style state-supported schools (including girls' 
schools), opening careers to talent, encouraging Iranian capital development, sepa-
rating religion and politics, and making Persian the national language. They were 
disillusioned with universal suffrage, since giving equal votes to peasants and the ur-
ban poor had enabled conservative landowners and the ulema to dominate the Fourth 
Majlis. They opposed provincial autonomy movements and favored strong central 
government. Tajadod and socialist objectives meshed well with Reza's own, and they 
were willing to work under military leadership.43 
Although Western viewers sometimes called this reform program socialist, it 
seems to have owed more to the liberal ideals of the 1789 French Revolution and 
of American Presbyterian educators, teaching in Iran since 1835,44 than of those of 
the Bolshevik Revolution. Tajadod support encouraged Reza to break with the Qa-
jar past. His government imposed new taxes, planned a railway to be financed en-
tirely by Iranian money, built new roads, established a national system of weights 
and measures, established a solar-based hijri calendar, imposed conscription, abol-
ished aU aristocratic 'titles, and ordered the adoption of surnames. Tajadod leaders 
also supported Reza's continuing military campaigns to unite the country (as did 
other Majlis groups). During 1924 the army successfully campaigned among the 
Bakhtiaris and the Lurs.45 
The Independents (munjaridin)-including Mustaufi al-Mamalek, Moshir al-
Dauleh, Taqizadeh, Ala, and Mossadegh-also supported Reza within the Fifth 
Majlis. These constitutionalists hoped to tap Reza's energy for progress; Reza met 
them regularly, and they helped him toward supreme power.46 
Reza miscalculated in March 1924 when he tried to establish a republic. Just 
before the Majlis under Tadayun's leadership was to vote, Turkey ended the cal-
iphate, galvanizing Islamic opinion against a republic. While Modarres filibus-
tered, other ulema-led demonstrations forced Reza to retreat. After a pitched battle 
between a crowd of 5,000 and two Pahlavi regiments in the Majlis garden on 22 
March, Reza withdrew to the country. On 26 March he went to Qum to confer 
with ayatollahs Hairi, Nacini, and Isfahani, after which they issued a joint state-
ment that Islam prohibited a republic. Reza then resigned from the prime ministry 
in order to be restored by the MajlisY 
Rebuilding Reza's authority after this incident led to further violence. During 
the summer of 1924, the government encouraged an ulema-led anti-Bahai pogrom. 
In early July, the opposition poet and newspaper editor Mir Zadeh Eshqi was mur-
dered by an unknown assailant rumored to be a government agent. On Friday, 18 
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July, American consul Robert Imbrie was beaten to death by a crowd led by mul-
lahs and largely composed of cossacks. Reza weathered the diplomatic storm cre-
ated by Imbrie's murder and used it to establish martial law in Tehran and jail his 
opponents.48 Then in the fall, he departed for the south to complete the unification 
of the country by imposing his will on the previously autonomous British-
supported Arab Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah (Khorramshahr). 
Once Khuzistan was subdued, Reza further consolidated his position. He ce-
mented religious support, going to Najaf in January 1925 to confer with Ayatollah 
Nacini before returning to Tehran. With the support of Modarres and Mossadegh, 
the Majlis then voted him the position of commander in chief of the armed forces, 
formerly a royal power. During the next months he moved to depose the Qajars, 
which the Majlis voted on 31 October 1925. Only Taqizadeh, Ala, Yahya Daula-
tabadi, and Mossadegh voted no. Mossadegh's argument that it was not "to achieve 
dictatorship that people bled their lives away in the Constitutional Revolution" was 
ignored. A Constituent Assembly was hastily chosen to change the constitution, 
and by its vote on 12 December Reza finally achieved total power. Only three So-
cialist deputies, including Suleiman Mirza Iskandari, abstained. No one opposed.49 
SIR PERCY LORAINE'S MISSION 
Reza Khan also had support from British minister Sir Percy Loraine. Contrary to 
previous policy, Loraine favored Reza's efforts to create a strong government, "a 
stable and self-dependent Persia, capable of maintaining herself unaided ... a new 
Persia disciplined and homogeneous."5o 
Before Loraine arrived in Tehran, Britain saw Iran as chaotic, a result especially 
of British bureaucratic disorganization. In addition to the legation, London re-
ceived often conflicting reports on Iran from consuls, military attaches, the gov-
ernment of India, the Imperial Bank of Persia, the Indo-European Telegraph 
Department, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC). In the cabinet, the 
Foreign Office had to defend its position against other departments whose argu-
ments were strengthened by British public indifference to Iran. Treasury strictures 
minimized funds available for subsidies to the tribes and British forces. The For-
eign Office denied funds to Qavam's government, which it regarded as hostile to 
British interests. Against Whitehall's advice, however, the Imperial Bank indepen-
dently financed Cossack expeditions against autonomist movements. British con-
fusion extended even to the key policy question of whether to support a strong 
central government (advocated by Curzon and the Imperial Bank) or to favor re-
gional autonomist movements (preferred by the India Office and APOC). Affairs 
were not made easier by Curzon's angry reaction to Iranian repudiation of the 
agreement. The careers of Norman and Reginald Bridgeman, charge d'affaires be-
fore Loraine's arrival, were both ruined by himY 
Loraine accepted Curzon's invitation to be minister at Tehran knowing the dan-
ger to his career that failure would entail. Tehran was his first ministerial post. As 
minister, Loraine developed great influence with the Foreign Office. He cultivated 
Curzon's confidence, and the foreign secretary usually supported his recommenda-
tions. Loraine's conduct followed what Harold Nicolson would later describe as 
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that of the ideal ambassador, "the chief channel of communication between his
own government and that to which he is accredited," attempting to establish "that
the word of command ... be delivered by a single voice only, and not by a chorus
of discordant voices." Loraine's reputation as a brilliant manager of British inter-
ests was well established by the time Curzon fell from office in December 1923
following Conservative defeat in the general election. Consequently, foreign sec-
retaries Ramsay MacDonald (Labour) and Austin Chamberlain (Conservative)
continued to give him a free hand.P
Loraine's career flourished in part due to his relationship with the Eastern De-
partment head, his cousin Lancelot Oliphant. Before the foreign secretary saw Lo-
raine's dispatches and telegrams, Oliphant almost invariably read and supported
them. Oliphant was best man at Loraine's 1924 wedding, and they frequently ex-
changed long, personal letters. By modem standards, their correspondence sug-
gests they were ethnocentric, arrogant, and acid tongued. For example, when
Loraine first arrived in Iran he described some Iranian officials in the Gulf as
"smelly" and "shifty brutes." He also called United States minister in Tehran Jo-
seph S. Kornfeld a "backwoods Rabbi." Similarly, Oliphant called the newly ap-
pointed Italian minister to Iran, "as nearly white as one is likely to find among the
ice creamers.t'P They seem to have assumed that conduct from those not of their
social caste would be less than civilized.
Loraine often said Britain should not interfere in Iran's affairs. He described his
policy about six months after he arrived in a letter to British resident A. P. Trevor
at Bushire. After surveying the weakness of Britain's position and the depth of the
opposition it faced, Loraine suggested that
We must go very warily, draw in our horns ... and rebuild our platform of action slowly
and laboriously, seeing that the bases of our post-war policy have been cut away from un-
der our feet. So I decline to interfere with Cabinet-making ... I decline to give a cent to
the press, and my tack is to let natural forces operate, while trying to make the Persians
realize and shoulder their own responsibilities, in order that they may realize from their
own experience, firstly their own ineptitude and secondly that it is positively in their own
interests to be on good terms with US. 54
Despite vowing noninterference, Loraine did involve Britain in Reza's rise in at
least seven ways.
Advocate. Favorabiy impressed when they met, Loraine became Reza's advocate.
"Reza Khan," he wrote on 31 January 1922,
is a powerfully built, well set up, big boned man, well above the average height, with a
quiet voice and a direct manner of speech which is most unusual in a Persian. He gets
straight to what he has to say, and does not waste time in exchanging the delicately phrased
but perfectly futile compliments so dear to the Persian heart. ... he has never spoken for
himself, nor for the Government of which he is a member, but only on behalf of his coun-
try ... an ignorant and uneducated man; nevertheless he betrays no awkwardness of man-
ner, nor self-consciousness, he has considerable natural dignity, and neither his speech nor
his features reveal any absence of self-control.55
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In short, Loraine believed Reza was a man with whom Britain could deal. 
He also understood that Iranian opinion would reject Reza if Britain openly 
aided him. "It would, in my opinion, be most unwise to offer Reza Khan our sup-
port," he wrote, but, "if the conviction with which I have sought to imbue him, that 
England is the only real and disinterested friend of Persia, sinks into his mind, he 
will insensibly turn to us when difficulties arise for him, as they are·bound to do, 
and we must then avoid any appearance of placing him under our protection."56 
Money. Loraine intervened with London to have the Imperial Bank of Persia ad-
vance money necessary to pay Reza's army. For example, on 6 February 1922, he 
cabled, " ... we are just as much interested as the Persian Government in [Lahuti 
Khan's rebellion's] immediate suppression," and he urged the Bank immediately to 
grant Reza Khan a 500,000-toman (approximately $500,000 or £100,000) over-
draft. Loraine believed that Reza's government was preferable to any which might 
replace it. He convinced London to smooth the way for the regular provision of 
financial support for Reza's army and governmentY 
The Millspaugh Mission. Loraine also shaped the work of the 1922-27 American 
financial mission. Iran engaged Americans in order to break British hegemony. 
Curzon endorsed the American mission after his own agreement failed, arguing, 
"The question by whom Persia is to be regenerated is of vastly less importance 
than that her regeneration should take place." Loraine encouraged the Americans 
to lay a financial foundation for a strong central government. "One day Persia may 
come to realize that her best chance of salvation lies in seeking the loyal aid ... of 
Great Britain," he wrote in May 1924, but "for the moment any chance of improve-
ment centers around Reza Khan and the American advisers."58 Loraine thus 
worked to prevent the Iranians playing the Americans against Britain. 
Loraine assessed the mission in 1926. Before coming to Iran, "Dr. Millspaugh 
was not friendly toward Great Britain, and ... was mainly instrumental in draw-
ing up the indictment against England ... seeking to establish a practical monop-
oly of the world's supplies of mineral oil." His idea of British aims, Loraine 
wrote, was "powerfully tinged by Mr. Morgan Shuster's notorious book, 'The 
Strangling of Persia.'" Although Millspaugh sought to free Persia from British en-
croachments, he never "desired and sought to undermine British practical influ-
ence in Persia"; he merely worked for "counterpoise to our influence." Loraine 
therefore left him on his own. By 1926 he believed Millspaugh was "convinced 
that British influence is never wantonly, unjustly or improperly used" and that 
"our silent sympathy and moral support ... [is] a definite asset to him in his task." 
"On the whole," he concluded, "such work as they have done has been well and 
truly laid. They have certainly improved the administrative organization of the 
Ministry of Finance; they have tightened up the collection of revenue; they have 
established a much more effective control over expenditure ... and have stead-
fastly discouraged the favouritism ... of the rich and powerful."59 In short, Lo-
raine concluded, the American mission had become an instrument of British 
policy, as Curzon intended, buttressing Reza's regime. 
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Military Monopoly. Supporting consolidation, Loraine intervened with London to 
help Reza establish military monopoly. Loraine firmly supported Tehran's policy 
disarming the tribes and rebellious military units. He discouraged any support for 
dissidents by London or Iraq. He encouraged Whitehall to have Reza's army acquire 
war surplus equipment (especially mountain guns), rebutting India and War office 
arguments. Loraine also urged Reza be given credit to buy new British trucks, air-
planes, and armored cars. He encouraged London to withdraw Indian forces from 
the Gulf ports, leading to withdrawal from Bushire, occupied since 1778.60 
Prime Minister. Loraine took part in the events by which Reza made himself 
prime minister and exiled Ahmad Shah at the end of October 1923. In the spring 
Loraine urged Whitehall to allow him to assist Reza to become prime minister, 
arguing that Reza " ... would be an inconvenient opponent: he might be a very 
useful friend." Loraine believed that Reza had gone far toward unifying Iran, that 
his success was in Britain's interest. The Iranian government, Loraine reported on 
1 June 1923, was paralyzed and would continue so unless Reza took over. He asked 
for permission to suggest to the shah that he appoint Reza, "in such a way that re-
fusal to entertain it would not commit us .... " The Foreign Office demurred and on 
5 June instructed Loraine to continue a policy of "complete disinterestedness."61 
On 1 September 1923, Loraine again argued for intervention. Reporting Iranian 
instability and dissatisfaction with the American advisers, he argued, "Minister of 
War is alone unshaken and maintains strong position." There was a "growing con-
viction amongst Persians," he said, "of unpalatable necessity of coming to terms 
with Great Britain." Four days earlier the shah had demanded an interview with 
Loraine, who acted as "His Imperial Majesty's father confessor." The shah_ feared 
a coup by Reza, and Loraine reported that "His Imperial Majesty cared only for 
his [own] personal life and liberty." On 3 September Loraine reported that the 
shah feared Reza Khan "means to be the Persian Kemal" and, anxious about his 
own safety, intended to leave for Europe as soon as he could. Curzon feared that, 
"If the Shah were to desert his Kingdom, it would be the end of his dynasty," and 
suggested that "a douche of cold water on his idea of flight might invigorate his 
natural pusillanimity."62 
The crisis came to a head on 24 October 1923. The Iranian government had re-
signed, Loraine cabled, Reza would become prime minister, and the shah would 
leave the country. Reza knew the risks of becoming prime minister, Sir Percy con-
cluded, but believed that no one else could govern. "He wants and needs British 
friendship." Two days later Loraine again reported to London that the shah "can-
not resist demand of Minister of War to become Prime Minister ... [and] cannot 
remain here with him." Loraine eased the shah's departure. "His Majesty is in 
such a state of nervous anxiety about himself that he would be quite useless even 
if he remained," he argued, "I ... will facilitate [a] solution ... and am seeing 
[the] Minister of War about it. ... " On 28 October 1923, he cabled, "Shah be-
haved lamentably. Reza Khan sensibly. I think my intervention, though unusual, 
has had four good results, (1) prevented a deadlock, (2) preserved constitutional 
continuity, (3) earned gratitude of Shah, (4) placed new Prime Minister under an 
obligation."63 
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After the dust settled, the Foreign Office approved Loraine's action. Victor Mal-
let began by noting that Reza was supported by Iranian opinion. 
Such tenns as "public opinion," "patriotism," "honesty" and "idealism," when used in con-
nection with Persia, are, of course, purely relative ... [but] the so-called Persian nationalist 
or "democratic" party reflects whatever public opinion is sufficiently educated to be 
articulate .... 
The fact that the terms "nationalist" and "democrat" ... have become almost synony-
mous may seem odd to those who see in the nationalist ebullitions of a Mussolini the antith-
esis of democracy. But in Persia they are not wholly incompatible. 
Mallet listed the points in dispute between Britain and Persia: the debt, the Iranian 
claim to Bahrain, order in Baluchistan, and Iranian recognition of King Faisal. If 
these could be resolved, Britain could withdraw its troops and support railway 
construction and a loan. He concluded, 
Our essential interests in Persia demand a stable and strong central government, able to re-
sist Russian penetration and the spread of Communist propaganda, to keep order on the 
trade routes, in the oil fields district and in the provinces on the Baluchi and Afghan fron-
tiers, and to check the anti-British activities of the priesthood and the press. It is toward 
such conditions that Reza Khan appears to be aiming. If in the efforts to obtain his objec-
tive, he occasionally falls foul of some minor British interest, it may be that at times it will 
be worth our while to give way, if by so doing we enhance our position at vital points, the 
oilfields, the Gulf, the Indian and Iraq frontiers. 
Oliphant approved this paper, noting that Reza "is patriotically minded and ... 
may consolidate [Iran] to a degree not hitherto attained."64 
Sheikh Khazal. The most difficult part of Loraine's promotion of Reza was his 
role in the destruction of Sheikh Khazal of Arabistan. Britain sacrificed Khazal as 
a "minor British interest" while Reza established "a stable and strong central gov-
ernment." After many years of captivity, in 1936 Khazal "died in suspicious cir-
cumstances while [still] under house imprisonment."65 
Britain began to establish special relationships with tribal leaders in southwest-
ern Iran when the Karun River was opened to navigation in 1888, increasing its 
presence in 1897 when the Lynch brothers built a "camel track" from Ahwaz to 
Isfahan. British presence again expanded with the development of the oil industry 
after the turn of the century.66 
Khazal succeeded his murdered brother as sheikh in 1897, and Britain rein-
forced its special relationship with him on several occasions. Following assign-
ment of southern customs control to Belgian administration and fearful of growing 
Russian interest, Britain gave Khazal written assurances of support in 1902. Sir 
Percy Cox repeated these assurances in 1907 and 1910. Cox and APOC represen-
tatives negotiated with Khazal, "rather than with ... Tehran for the oil company's 
first pipe line and the land on which to build the refinery at Abadan." Subse-
quently, Britain made Khazal a Knight Commander of the Indian Empire. Britain 
reiterated its guarantees of his autonomy after the outbreak of World War I, dur-
ing which Khazal defended British interests. In 1919 Britain rewarded him with a 
river steamer "for his services during the war," and gave him "3,000 rifles and 
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ammunition to enable him to protect the ... Oil Company and cover the with-
drawal of British forces from Khuzistan."6? 
Reza moved slowly against Khazal. His initial goal, to collect taxes, required mov-
ing troops into Khuzistan. At first Britain opposed this plan, fearing loss of the oil 
fields. Loraine tried to mediate between Khazal and Reza, and informed Khazal that 
British support depended on following British advice. Loraine advised Khazal not to 
resist Tehran and to pay his taxes; he also asked Reza to confirm Khazal's autonomy 
and not to move troops southward. Although Reza replied in a conciliatory manner, 
his troops moved south.68 
Reza's growing power forced Britain to choose between continued support of 
local autonomy or a strong central government. Advocates of the southern policy 
included Cox, Arnold Wilson who was an informal adviser to Khazal as well as 
the APOC manager, George Churchill, and Walter Smart, who doubted that "Reza 
Khan could last twenty years, reconsolidate and reform Persia," and who argued 
against "throw[ing] away these southern trumps."69 
The debate was already fully developed when Loraine cabled London on 5 May 
1923, urging London to reexamine its Iranian policy. Loraine favored the central 
government against tribal autonomists. "To support Minister of War means the al-
most certain lapse of our local friendships of which the most important and diffi-
cult case is that of Sheikh of Mohammerah; but support might enable us to control 
Reza Khan to some extent and perhaps tie him down to definite assurances as re-
gards Sheikh's position. Support would also strengthen bulwark against Russia." 
To oppose Reza, on the other hand, meant the "Gradual collapse of our position 
and influence unless we uphold them and our friends by force; Thwarting the one 
chance that has appeared for decades of stability of Persia under Persian control;' 
A period of intense friction with Persian Government almost certainly leading to a 
rupture; [and] Playing into the hands of Russia."?O 
At first the Foreign Office opposed Loraine. Churchill argued for, "the policy al-
ready adopted," namely, "(a) support of the Bakhtiaris by financial means through 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company ... and (b) support of the Sheikh of Moham-
merah, even though such support may eventually lead to the dispatch of a gunboat 
to Mohammerah ... if Reza cannot be made to see the folly of his present course, 
it is possible for us to exert pressure upon him by withholding that financial assis-
tance without which he will be utterly incapable of maintaining his army .... "71 
On 1 June 1923, Loraine reported that Reza and Prime Minister Mustaufi pro-
posed to send two hundred men to Shush tar but were willing to guarantee not to 
interfere with the sheikh. London considered the request, cabling Loraine to, "in-
sist as a sine qua non . .. on previous written undertaking being given by Reza 
Khan ... and ... countersigned by Prime Minister."72 
In October, Loraine sent London a memorandum prepared by military attache 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sanders on the strength of the tribes and Reza Khan's plans to 
disarm them. Loraine concluded, "there is no reason why Serdar Sepah should not 
be able to carry out the scheme of disarming the tribes .... I think the general re-
sult will be beneficial to British interests."?3 
The crisis began while Loraine was on leave. Reza provoked Khazal into open 
rebellion, and the Foreign Office sped Loraine back to Iran with instructions to 
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"support Reza Khan and in the last resort throw over the Shaikh risking his total 
disappearance from Arabistan .... " As Reza's troops approached, Loraine flew to 
Ahwaz and got Khazal to apologize for the rebellion. Although Loraine gave 
Khazal his word that he would urge Reza to withdraw and cabled Tehran to that 
effect, Reza did not retreat. Instead, Reza used the sheikh's Loraine-induced quies-
cence to tighten his grip on the entire province. On 24 November 1924, Reza in-
formed Loraine that "the conditions ... for Khazal's pardon were unconditional 
surrender and his presence in Tehran." Four days later Khazal gave up, "ordered 
the disbandment of his forces ... and retired from Ahwaz to his palace at Moham-
merah, where his yacht lay moored in the river." The next week, 6-8 December, 
Loraine mediated between Khazal and Reza at Ahwaz. Loraine tried to convince 
the sheikh he must capitulate. Khazal still believed he could count on British pro-
tection, and Loraine found it "amazingly difficult to get a new idea into his head 
... even harder to dislodge an old one." In the end, however, he gained Khazal's 
agreement to a temporary Iranian occupation of Khuzistan.74 
Reza's troops never left; in April 1925 they arrested Khazal and took him to 
Tehran, where he remained under house arrest until his death. Reza also seized 
Khazal's property. Despite legation advocacy, none was returned while Reza 
ruled. "The whole thing makes me very sad, because I have personal affection for 
the old man in spite of his failings," Loraine wrote. Well, it might have made him 
sad, but support for a strong Iranian government required Britain to renege on 
older pledges to local forces. Under Loraine's guidance, Britain chose to appease 
the emerging dictator Reza Khan. Loraine expressed pleasure at his achievement; 
Reza, he cabled, "is stronger and more popular than ever: he has understood for 
himself that our policy in the south is loyal and helpful and not disintegrating 
while Russian policy has been the reverse."75 
The Crown. Finally, Loraine helped ease Reza's 1925 seizure of the crown. After 
his abortive 1924 republic, Reza hesitated. Perhaps he anticipated Dr. Mos-
sadegh's later Majlis argument in opposition to the move; while as prime minister 
he was a fine servant of the country, as shah he would be responsible to no one. 
Perhaps, as Abrahamian suggests, he hesitated to lose support from the left. Per-
haps, too, he paused because of the promise he had given Ironside in 1921 "not to 
take or allow to be taken any violent measures to depose the Shah."76 More impor-
tant than any promise was the matter of whether Britain would allow him to take 
the throne; Reza seems to have believed Britain could prevent it. The British dip-
lomatic record is clear; Reza tried to discover how Britain would respond to such 
a coup. Loraine repeatedly reassured him that it was a purely Iranian affair, of 
complete indifference to London. Once Loraine convinced him that Britain would 
do nothing, Reza moved to establish his own dynasty. 
By 1925 the Foreign Office had no use for the Qajars. Victor Mallet (George 
Churchill's successor at the Foreign Office) declared Ahmad Shah "a miserable 
creature entirely lacking in courage and quite untrustworthy." Oliphant agreed, 
writing on 10 July that "the Shah is a miserable and contemptible individual 
whose repeated statements that he is about to return to Persia no longer carry con-
viction with anyone." In October, Loraine cabled that Reza "must feel safe from 
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interference in view of our repeated declarations of neutrality in internal affairs." 
Mallet commented, "Reza Khan's great hero is Nadir Shah: it would not be sur-
prising if he were to model his career on that of Nadir. It would be madness for us 
to take any hand in this intricate and dangerous game now being played .... "77 
Loraine could not escape being sounded. Iranian foreign minister Hassan Khan 
Moshar al-Mulk asked him on 20 October about the British government's attitude 
toward a change of dynasty. Loraine said that Britain would not take sides. This 
was not clear enough for Reza. The next day Moshar al-Mulk informed Loraine 
that Reza Khan "wants to get rid of [the] Kajars, but fears disapproval" of Lon-
don; "he interprets silence as inconstancy." Loraine replied that, "I did not myself 
see what Reza Khan could hope for more than our loyal and friendly attitude of 
strict non-intervention." Whitehall approved, "Sir P. Loraine's [most judicious] 
language .... "78 
This language also eased Reza's doubts. On 29 October Reza allowed Loraine 
"to understand that this time the issue with the dynasty will be pressed to a deci-
sion." Loraine's silence doomed the Qajars. Two days later the Majlis granted 
Reza headship of state until the meeting of a national constituent assembly. De-
spite outspoken opposition by Mossadegh, Taqizadeh, and Ala, Loraine cabled 
that the changes were well received. Qum and Najaf apparently accepted the 
change, and Modarres abstained from the vote. The Foreign Office noted that "the 
revolution has passed off calmly."79 
Loraine pressed London to recognize the new regime before any other power 
did so. On 2 November 1925, Britain granted "provisional recognition," which 
Reza received with the "liveliest satisfaction." Responding to this report, the FQr-
eign Office noted that "the mutual understanding between Sir P. Loraine and Reza 
Khan is likely to be a valuable asset to US."80 
The Foreign Office guardedly expressed pleasure at the word that Reza intended 
to become shah. Mallet noted, "On the whole a monarchy seems the best regime 
for Persia, and there seems no good reason why Reza Khan should not found a 
new dynasty. Persian history presents many examples of such changes; indeed the 
Kajars themselves came in on a revolution, while Nadir Shah rose ... in a very 
similar way .... " He added, "The Soviet will feel rather sore, if, having encour-
aged the elimination of the Kajars, they find another monarchy set up." Oliphant 
observed, "The world was a very different place when the Kajar dynasty was 
founded 150 years ago. While at the moment Reza Khan is clearly the only 
choice, it would be rash to cast a horoscope of his dynasty."81 
The Constituent Assembly met in Tehran on 6 December 1925, and on 12 De-
cember it voted to amend the constitution to grant the throne to Reza Khan, now 
styled His Imperial Majesty Reza Shah Pahlavi. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was 
named heir to the throne. The coronation took place on 25 April 1926. 
Vita Sackville-West wrote a vivid account of the coronation, which, read today, 
seems to foreshadow later events, to cast the horoscope which Oliphant feared to 
do. "In appearance Reza was an alarming man," she wrote, "six foot three in 
height, with a sullen manner, a huge nose, grizzled hair and a brutal jowl; he 
looked in fact what he was, a Cossack trooper," she observed, "nor had he any ri-
val in the lax limp nation he had mastered." Participating with Lady Loraine in the 
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selection of jewels to decorate the Gulistan Palace and the coronation robes, Sack-
ville-West watched "linen bags vomit ... emeralds and pearls." Her view of the 
coronation was equally striking. 
Expectancy and imminence brooded over the crowded hall, heightened by the silence; even 
whispers about the delay were now hushed; at last there came a stir; the doors were opened, 
and the figure of a little boy appeared. Quite alone, dressed in uniform, he marched down 
the length of the room, saluting, and took his place on the lowest step of the throne, His Im-
perial Highness, Shahpur Mohammed Reza, Crown Prince of Persia. Escorted by his Gen-
erals and his Ministers ... the Shah advanced towards the Peacock Throne. The European 
women curtsied to the ground; the men inclined themselves low on his passage; the mullahs 
shambled forward in a rapacious, proprietary wave; the little prince, frightened, possessed 
himself of a corner of his father's cloak. Only the silence seemed strange; one expected a 
blare of trumpets, a crashing of chords, and nothing came. Then from outside came a salvo 
of guns, making the windows rattle, proclaiming to the crowds in the streets that Reza Khan 
was King of Kings and Centre of the Universe.82 
One should not make too much of this brilliant description, but it is hard not to see 
in it a foreshadowing of later problems. 
Loraine, of course, expressed only satisfaction with the success of his policy 
and the new regime. Was he realistic or merely self-congratulatory? His successor 
Harold Nicolson believed that Loraine's picture was far too rosy. As early as 28 
August 1926, he wrote critically of "Loraine's 'hero-worship' of Reza," and a 
month later he wrote a long dispatch urging a policy review. In particular, Nicol-
son criticized Reza Shah who he doubted had "the intellectual or moral calibre 
necessary for his high functions." Nicolson saw Reza to be "secretive, suspicious 
and ignorant ... wholly unable to grasp the realities of the situation or to -fealise 
the force of the hostility which he has aroused. His internal policy is apparently to 
discredit all possible rivals; his foreign policy is apparently to bribe his enemies 
and to abuse his friends."83 The Foreign Office angrily rejected this analysis, and, 
led by Oliphant, defended Loraine: Nicolson and Robert Clive, the new minister, 
were told to continue Loraine's policy of good relations and nonintervention. 
By the end of 1927, however, it became clear to the British in Tehran that Reza 
Shah "is one thousand times worse than Ahmad Shah in his love of money and 
land, and in the short two years that he has been proclaimed Shah, he has amassed 
a huge, huge fortune." Eventually, the Foreign Office turned to share Nicolson's 
assessment of Reza. By 1932 they referred to him as "a dull savage of the ser-
geant-major type," and a year later a "bloodthirsty lunatic." For better or for 
worse, however, Loraine had bet Britain's interests on Reza and helped to make 
him shah. 84 
CONCLUSIONS 
British involvement in the rise of Reza Shah grew out of complex interaction be-
tween two quite different histories. Politically aware Iranians loathed their coun-
try's weakness and occupation by foreigners after World War I and consequently 
supported Reza Khan's efforts to build a strong central government. Reza gained 
support from religious and secular nationalists for his military rule because of 
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their disappointment with recent events. The ulema generally opposed foreign 
influence and also disliked the secular anticlericalism of the Tajadod and Socialist 
parties. They were won over by Reza's actions to end regional and tribal separat-
ism, to reduce British and Russian financial and military influence, and by his 
seeming support of Islam. Their importance was clearly demonstrated in the 1924 
republican episode, and their renewed support of Reza's stewardship helps to ex-
plain how Modarres, so effective in stopping a republic, failed to prevent his as-
cent to the throne.85 
Likewise Reza gained the support of modernizing reformers, disillusioned with 
civilian weakness against British and Russian penetration and also with the results 
of universal manhood suffrage in the election of the Fourth Majlis. Understanding 
that under such a regime conservative landowners and the ulema would dominate 
elections, liberal reformers tied their fate to Reza's power in hope that his force 
could achieve their program. Reza did impose many of their reforms, against 
popular wishes.86 
Any view of Reza's rise to supreme power in the years 1921-26 is inevitably 
colored by understanding of how he acted afterwards. How could a man so suspi-
cious, intolerant of dissent, greedy, and brutal have had the support necessary to 
become shah? Obscuring the reality of this support, many people have argued that 
Britain made Reza shah. This is an exaggeration. 
For over a century, Britain had regarded Iran as vital to its interests. Despite its 
weakness after World War I, England tried to extend its holdings. Meeting resis-
tance from Arabs and Turks as well as Iranians, Whitehall adjusted its policy to ac-
commodate nationalism. In Iraq, Britain recognized Faisal as king in 1921. In Egypt, 
Britain unilaterally proclaimed Egyptian independence in 1922, with reservations.'. 
Likewise at the Lausanne Conference (1922-23), Britain reluctantly accepted the 
Turkish nation-stateY And in Iran after the failure of the 1919 Anglo-Persian 
agreement, Britain came to terms with nationalism by supporting Reza Pahlavi. 
Britain encouraged Reza's rise in two stages. First, local agents gave tangible 
assistance to the February 1921 coup, for the most part without London's knowl-
edge. Perceiving Soviet threat, British weakness, and Iranian disorganization and 
hostility, individuals acted to nudge Iranian politics in a seemingly helpful direc-
tion. While Ironside later claimed to have acted on Reza's behalf, contemporary 
evidence suggests that Norman, Smart, and Smyth favored others, notably Seyyid 
Zia. For various reasons-including London's unwillingness to support the Zia 
government, the firepower left to the Cossacks by Norperforce, and his own 
single-minded pursuit of national unity-Reza Khan became the chief beneficiary 
of the coup. 
Second, Loraine aided Reza. When he went to Tehran he understood that money 
was short and the cabinet was divided but that Britain's interests remained fixed: 
to keep Russia at bay and protect the oil fields and other imperial positions in Iraq, 
the Gulf, and India. Early on Loraine decided Reza was the strongest player in 
Iran and that England did not have resources to impose a solution without him. 
His advocacy was reinforced when Mallet succeeded Churchill at the Foreign 
Office in 1923. Making a virtue of necessity, Loraine backed Reza as a man who 
could achieve order in Iran and thus further British interests. 
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In retrospect, Loraine's support of Reza may have been naive and self-serving. 
Loraine disparaged cautionary voices, including Modarres, Ala, and Mossadegh. 
He also deprecated opposing views within the British establishment. Although Reza 
Shah did keep Russia out of Iran, he soon ended the capitulations, made demands 
on the APOC, and made claims on the British position at Bahrain and on the Iraq 
boundary. These Iranian initiatives should have been foreseen. Reza also weakened 
his own internal position by mistreating the Majlis and potential rivals, making 
more difficult long-term Iranian stability, which was perhaps Loraine's most impor-
tant objective in appeasing his rise. This too Loraine might have foreseen. 
Loraine aided Reza's rise in substantial, diplomatic ways. He removed obsta-
cles, such as lack of money, opposition from Ahmad Shah and Sheikh Khazal, and 
Reza's own fear that Britain would intervene to stop his climb to the throne. Lo-
raine took pleasure in having picked Reza as a potential winner and backing him 
early on, but that favorable diplomatic assessment was a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
British backing thus was part of the process by which Reza achieved sovereign 
power in Iran and became shah. 
It was Reza Pahlavi's tragedy as well as Iran's that Dr. Mossadegh's warning 
about irresponsible power foreshadowed future problems. Reza Shah answered to 
no one, and his patience grew increasingly short. Power can corrupt; under Reza's 
absolute rule the Pahlavi state developed into a tyranny excoriated by liberal na-
tionalists and Islamic activists alike. But that is another story. 
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